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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hambrick challenged his conviction for trafficking in
cocaine, alleging three errors: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict on either of the two theories advanced by the State, (2) that the district court
erred when it allowed a police officer to offer his opinion, over objection, as to how many
hundredths of a gram of cocaine he believed he used in a presumptive drug test, and
(3) when it refused to instruct the jury as to entrapment.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict on both theories, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it allowed the police officer to testify about how much cocaine he
believed he used in conducting the presumptive drug test, and that the district court
correctly refused to give an entrapment instruction because Mr. Hambrick "failed to
establish that there was any evidence from which the jury could find entrapment."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-20.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to rebut the State's arguments, which are either
incorrect as a matter of law or unsupported by the record.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Hambrick's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUES
1.

Are the State's arguments against Mr. Hambrick's sufficiency claims persuasive?

2.

Was Detective Harmon's opinion testimony properly admitted?

3.

If admission of Detective Harmon's opinion testimony was erroneous, has the
State demonstrated that its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt?

4.

Was there evidence to support an entrapment defense?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State's Arguments Against Mr. Hambrick's Sufficiency Claims Are Unpersuasive
In response to Mr. Ham brick's arguments that neither theory 1 of the case was
supported by substantial evidence, the State argued that sufficient evidence was
presented for both theories.

(Respondent's

Brief,

pp.6-9.)

In

response to

Mr. Hambrick's argument that assuming, arguendo, that only one of the two theories
was supported by sufficient evidence, this Court should overrule an Idaho Court of
Appeals opinion (State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452 (Ct. App. 1993)) rejecting such an
argument, the State asserted the doctrine of stare decisis, arguing that "this Court[ 2]
[sic] need not address Hambrick's invitation to abandon its [sic] long-held precedent
established in State v. Enyeart[.]" (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) The State also argued
against Mr. Hambrick's request that this Court overrule Enyeart, claiming that he "has
failed to show how his due process rights are in anyway [sic] implicated by this case."
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.)

1

The two bases upon which Mr. Hambrick could have been convicted were: (1) by
representing the weight of the cocaine to be at least 28 grams, or (2) if the cocaine
actually weighted at least 28 grams upon delivery.
2
As required by Idaho Appellate Rule 36, the briefs of both the State and Mr. Hambrick
are addressed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. (See Appellant's Brief,
cover, and Respondent's Brief, cover.) This is consistent with the statute establishing
the Idaho Court of Appeals, which, in relevant part, provides, "[T]he Idaho court of
appeals shall have jurisdiction to hear and to decide all cases assigned to it by the
Idaho supreme court[.]" I.C. § 1-2406(1); see also I.C. § 1-204 (The Supreme Court's
"appellate jurisdiction extends to a review of all cases removed to it under such
regulations as are now or may be prescribed by law, from tl1e final decisions of the
district courts, or the judges thereof."); see also I.A.R. 108 (providing the method by
which the Supreme Court assigns cases to the Court of Appeals). Nothing in the record
at this time indicates that this case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals.
3

A. The State's Enyeart Arguments

1.

The Stare Decisis Argument

The State's stare decisis argument is based on a misunderstanding of the
concept, and, as such, should be rejected.

The State mistakenly asserts that the

principle of stare decisis requires that this Court respect a decision of the Court of
Appeals and not overrule it lightly.

The only citations provided in support of this

argument are not supportive of the State's argument.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10

(citing State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9 (2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660
(2000); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001 (1992) 3 ; and State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho
384, 388 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v.

Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 577 (2008)).
The portions of Dana, Humphreys, Guzman, and Odiaga cited by the State all
stand for the principle that decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court are entitled to respect
under the principle of stare decisis.

See Dana, 137 Idaho at 9 ("'[T]he rule of stare

decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent] .... "') (brackets in original)
(citations omitted); Humphreys, 134 Idaho at 660 ("We recognize that this Court should
not consider overruling controlling precedent if the Court can dispose of the appeal on
other grounds."); Odiaga, 125 Idaho at 388 ("Having previously decided this question,
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, we are guided

3

The State's citation to, and quotation from, Guzman is not from the opinion of the
Court. It is actually from Justice Johnson's partial dissent, a fact that it did not note in its
briefing. (Respondent's Brief, p.11 ("see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001,
842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ('[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are
manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.')" (bracket in
original).) Nonetheless, the quote from Guzman does not support the State's argument.
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by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as expressed in our earlier
opinions.") (citation omitted).
This Court should reject the State's stare decisis argument because it is not
supported by the case law cited by the State and because it is not consistent with the
relevant statutes and appellate rules.

2.

The Due Process Argument

The State's argument that "Hambrick has failed to show how his due process
rights are in anyway [sic] implicated by this case [Enyeart]" is incorrect.

In his

Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hambrick cited the opinions of several other state supreme courts,
including the Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision in State v. Jones, 29 P.3d 351 (Haw.
2001 ), in which those courts held that it was a violation of the due process clauses of
their respective state constitutions to allow a conviction based on two theories to stand
when one of those theories was not supported by sufficient evidence. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.11-13.)
In declining to apply the United States Supreme Court's reasoning interpreting
the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause when interpreting the Hawaii
Constitution's due process clause, the Supreme Court of Hawaii explained,
"We are not convinced by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Griffin[ 4 ]
that the jury will necessarily reject a theory unsupported by legally
sufficient evidence, particularly where there is some evidence adduced
and considerable argument presented to the jury."

4

Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) (finding no violation of the United States
Constitution's Due Process Clause to allow a conviction to stand when insufficient
evidence was presented as to one of two theories on which the jury was asked to
convict).
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(Appellant's Brief, p.12 (quoting Jones, 29 P.3d at 371 ).)
The State's claim that Mr. Hambrick failed to show that his due process rights
were implicated by the Court of Appeals' opinion in Enyeart is incorrect, and should be
rejected by this Court.

B.

The Sufficiency Argument As To Actual Weigl1t
In the portion of its Respondent's Brief disputing Mr. Hambrick's argument that

the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on an actual weight theory, the
State provided no citation to any case law or legal authority in support of its conclusory
argument that the evidence was sufficient. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.)

Mr. Hambrick

asserts that this Court should refuse to consider the State's argument on this point
because the State has failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(6) ("The
argument [portion of the briefing] shall contain the contentions of the respondent with
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.").
The State also failed to address the analogous case law offered by Mr. Hambrick
in support of his argument, specifically, State v. Estes, 148 Idaho 345 (Ct. App. 2009).
Mr. Hambrick will not reiterate his argument, based on Estes, that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of guilt on the actual weight theory; he will instead rely
upon the argument set forth in his Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.)

C.

The Sufficiency Argument As To Represented Weight
With respect to his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support a

finding

of guilt under the

represented
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weight theory,

the State

argues that

Mr. Hambrick's argument "ignores Detective Harmon's testimony that because the deal
was set up for an ounce, Hambrick's assurance that the 'weight was good' meant that
he had in fact delivered the ounce he had promised. (Tr., p.232, L.10 - p.233, L.6;
Tr., p.247, L.23 - p.248, L.9.)" (Respondent's Brief, p.7.)
The State's argument ignores the argument set forth in Mr. Hambrick's
Appellant's Brief that none of the State's witnesses attributed any statement of weight to
Mr. Hambrick except the statement that the weight was "right." (Appellant's Brief, pp.89.) All of this uncertainty and speculation could have been avoided had the State done
what Mr. Hambrick suggested in his Appellant's Brief, namely:
[l]f the State had merely called the confidential informant as a witness it
could, presumably, have provided sufficient context [for the weight is right
statement] by having the confidential informant testify as to the terms of
his deal with Mr. Hambrick, including what statements were made during
their unrecorded and unmonitored telephone calls.
(Appellant's Brief, p.9 n. 7.)
Mr. Hambrick continues to assert that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of guilt under either theory advanced by the State. As such, he again requests
that this Court vacate his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, and remand this matter to
tl1e district court for resentencing on the delivery charge. 5

5

As noted in his Appellant's Brief, "[t]he only difference between the delivery charge
and the trafficking charge is the weight element (either represented or actual)."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11 n. 12.) Mr. Hambrick has continuously acknowledged that the
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for delivery of cocaine. (Tr., p.313, L.14
- p.327, L.11 (closing argument in which defense counsel conceded guilt on the
delivery charge).)
7

11.
Detective Harmon's Opinion Testimony Was Not Properly Admitted
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Detective Harmon's testimony in
which he estimated how many hundredths of a gram of cocaine he used in conducting a
presumptive drug test was properly admitted under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701
because the testimony of Detective Harmon established a foundation for his opinion
based on "his lengthy experience in narcotics interdiction and the fact that he personally
conducted the field test." (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-16.) The State also argues,
Hambrick has failed to show that weights and measures, even under the
metric system, are so esoteric as to require "technical or other specialized
knowledge" that would not permit the detective who personally conducted
the field test to opine that he used more than 1/100th of a gram of the
cocaine.
(Respondent's Brief, p.13.)

For the reasons that follow, the State's arguments are

unpersuasive.
The State's argument regarding foundation completely ignores the fact that
Detective Harmon testified that he had never previously measured 1/100th of a gram of
anything, let alone cocaine. (Appellant's Brief, p.15 n.17 (citing Tr., p.175, Ls.11-13).)
The State merely relies upon the detective's experience in "narcotics interdiction" and
the fact that he administered the presumptive drug test.

Neither of those facts,

especially in light of the detective's testimony that he had never previously measured
1/100th of a gram, provides the foundation required under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701.
The State's argument that Mr. Hambrick "failed to show that weights and
measures ... are so esoteric as to require 'technical or other specialized knowledge"'
ignores the following argument from his Appellant's Brief:

8

When considered with the scientifically-trained laboratory technician's
admitted inability to provide a visual estimate of 1/1 00[th] of a gram of
cocaine and testimony that the margin of error on the laboratory's
regularly-calibrated scales is 1/1 00[th] of a gram, it is clear that the State
failed to lay a foundation for the admission of Detective Harmon's opinion
regarding how much cocaine he used when conducting the presumptive
drug test
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

The State's assertion that a human being who had never

before measured 1/100th of a gram of cocaine was properly qualified to give an estimate
that neither a regularly-calibrated scientific scale nor the State's own scientific expert
could give (a measurement of 11100th of a gram) is, to say the least, unpersuasive.
This Court should find that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed
an unqualified witness, for whom no proper foundation was laid, to provide objected-to
opinion testimony regarding the number of hundredths-of-grams he used in testing the
cocaine. If this Court so finds, then Mr. Hambrick requests that this Court vacate his
conviction for trafficking in cocaine, and remand this matter for a new trial.

111.
The State Has Failed To Demonstrate That Admission Of Detective Harmon's
Testimony Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
In addition to arguing that Detective Harmon's testimony was properly admitted,
the State argued that, even if it was erroneously admitted, any error in admitting the
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt "because the evidence was
overwhelming that Hambrick had represented the cocaine's weight as an ounce."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.)
The State's assertion that the evidence was

"overwhelming" regarding

Mr. Hambrick's representation of the weight of the cocaine is unsupported by the facts

9

in the record. Specifically, it ignores the State's own argument, in an earlier section of
its briefing, that the evidence of represented weight was such that "the jury could have
easily and correctly inferred that Hambrick had represented the cocaine to weigh an
ounce." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Additionally, it ignores the fact that no witness was
able to testify that Mr. Hambrick ever made any specific statement about the weight of
the cocaine other than stating that the weight was "right." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

IV.

Some Evidence Was Presented To Support An Entrapment Defense
With respect to Mr. Hambrick's argument that the district court erred when it
refused to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, the State argues that "[a]
review of the law and the record shows that Hambrick's claim of entrapment is not
supported by any reasonable view of the evidence."

(Respondent's Brief, p.18.)

Mr. Hambrick asserts that he established that "a reasonable view of at least some
evidence" supported giving the entrapment instruction. See State v. Henry, 138 Idaho
364, 367 (Ct. App. 2003) (a jury instruction requested by one of the parties must be
given when, inter alia, "a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support the
defendant's legal theory").
Mr. Hambrick asserts that the standard - whether "a reasonable view of at least
some evidence" supports giving the instruction

should require consideration of the

defense evidence in the light most favorable to the defense. In other words, it should
not require excluding all other possible meanings of the evidence in order for such an
instruction to be given.

In this case, at least some evidence supporte.d each of the

"elements" of the entrapment defense. As noted in his initial brief,
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The undisputed testimony was that it was Detective Bruner who came up
with the idea to commit the crime .... [T]he testimony that the confidential
informant was unsuccessful in attempting to arrange to buy one-half
ounce of cocaine from Mr. Hambrick supports an inference that an agent
of the State talked him into committing the crime. Finally, with respect to
whether Mr. Hambrick was willing to commit the crime before the
confidential informant got involved, the testimony that Mr. Hambrick was
nervous, coupled with the earlier unsuccessful attempt to get
Mr. Hambrick to sell cocaine, provides some factual basis from which the
jury could have found that Mr. Hambrick was not predisposed to deal in
cocaine.
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.)
The State's argument that "[e]vidence that Hambrick would not sell cocaine in
half ounces because he was only willing to sell it in full ounces cannot reasonably give
rise to an inference that Hambrick lacked the disposition to sell cocaine" is incorrect.
The State presented no evidence that Mr. Hambrick had ever previously sold cocaine in
any amount. He further submits that the evidence was not such as to show that he was
predisposed to deal in cocaine before the government's informant contacted him. See
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992) (In light of the government's
conduct, "it is our view that the Government did not prove that this predisposition was
independent and not the product of the attention that the Government had directed at
the petitioner since January 1985."). 6
As noted above, "some evidence" was presented at trial that Mr. Hambrick was
entrapped. Whether that evidence ultimately would have persuaded a jury to acquit him
of the charges is not the standard by which this Court measures the failure to give such

6

Jacobson concerned whether the federal government had established, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Jacobson was not entrapped. The jury in Jacobson was
instructed on entrapment before finding him guilty. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548.
11

an instruction, rather it is whether there was some evidence from which a jury could
have inferred that he was entrapped.
Because the district court failed to give his requested instruction on entrapment
after he presented some evidence from which the jury could have inferred that he was
entrapped, Mr. Hambrick requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this
matter to the district court for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hambrick
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction for trafficking in
cocaine because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, and remand
this matter to the district court for resentencing on the delivery charge.

In the

alternative, in light of the erroneous admission of Detective Harmon's opinion testimony
and the district court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment, he requests
that this Court vacate his conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a
further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2011.

SPENCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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